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Abstract
In this article, we consider illiquid life annuity contracts and show that they may
be preferred to Yaari (1965)’s liquid contracts. In an overlapping-generation
economy, liquid life annuities are demanded only if the equilibrium is dynami-
cally ineﬃcient. Alternatively, an equilibrium displaying a positive demand for
illiquid life annuities is eﬃcient. In this latter case, the welfare at steady-state
is larger if illiquid life annuity contracts are available.
1 Introduction
In this article, we challenge the common thought that the life annuity contract
proposed by Yaari in his seminal 1965’s paper is optimal. We indeed show,
in a standard neo-classical framework, that another contract, which actually
resembles much more to the contracts oﬀered by insurance companies, may be
preferred by rational individuals.
The economic theory of annuities has been strongly inﬂuenced by Yaari
(1965). He studies the optimal demand for annuities in a life-cycle model with
or without bequest motives. The ﬁnancial asset that is named annuity by Yaari
has the following characteristics: the returns are positive if the bearer is alive
and zero if he is not. Annuities are nevertheless demanded since their returns are
larger than the one yielded by risk-free bonds. The diﬀerence between the two
yields is the annuity premium, which is said to be fair when it equals the inverse
of the survival probability. Importantly, as the individual ages, the premium
increases. This characterization of an annuity has been quite inﬂuential and has
lead to numerous studies (See among others Davidoﬀ et al, 2005, and Sheshinski,
2008).
Many types of annuity contracts exist (Cannon and Towks, 2008). Their
common features are quite diﬀerent from Yaari’s annuities. First, the premium is
age-independent. The individual purchases some annuities during youth and, at
a given age -let say the age at retirement- he periodically receives a ﬁxed amount
as long as he survives. Second, the contract is irreversible. Once payments have
begun, one can not recover the amount invested. An implicit assumption in
Yaari is that agents, upon survival, receive the capital and the interests of their
annuity. This means that they are in position to renegotiate their contract at
each period, and that is why the premium increases as the individual ages.
In this article, we propose a standard framework in which the individual has
the choice between two types of life annuity contract. The ﬁrst one that we
named ﬂexible, is the one proposed by Yaari (1965). The second one, which is
named illiquid, is irreversible and proposes age-independent returns. In both
case, we suppose that the annuity premium is such that the insurance companies
make no proﬁt. Illiquid annuities have been introduced in life-cycle models by
Horneﬀ et al. (2008) and Peijnenburg et al. (2011) in order to discuss the issue
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about the low demand for annuities. Our purpose is to study analytically the
equilibrium and welfare consequences of the existence of such contracts.
First, we analyze the life-cycle optimal decision under uncertain lifetime.
Importantly, we consider a setting in which the individual ages, which more
precisely means that survival probabilities decrease with age. We therefore
depart from two-period life-cycle models or from Blanchard (1985)’s setting in
which our distinction between increasing and ﬁxed returns makes no sense. We
obtain that illiquid annuity are preferred to ﬂexible one if the expected returns of
the ﬁrst are suﬃciently greater than those of the second. This is the consequence
of an arbitrage between more ﬂexibility and more returns.
Second, we consider the general equilibrium of our economy, in which returns
of both contracts are determined by the markets. We study a simple overlap-
ping generation economy, similar to the one analyzed by Diamond (1965). Sur-
prisingly, we show that illiquid annuities are preferred when the equilibrium is
dynamically eﬃcient while ﬂexible annuities are preferred when it is ineﬃcient.
We then discuss about the optimality of both annuity contracts. In particu-
lar, for dynamically eﬃcient equilibrium, the welfare at steady-state is larger if
illiquid life annuity contracts are available.
Finally, to test the robustness of our results, we propose three extensions of
our model by considering successively a background risk, a bequest motive and
a subjective evaluation of survival probabilities.
2 Individual behavior
2.1 Demographics
We consider an overlapping generations model in which agents live a ﬁnite and
uncertain length of time. They live for a maximum of three periods, also called
ages, which are denoted i = {0, 1, 2}. The probability of being alive at age i,
conditional on survival until age i − 1, is denoted pi. Survival probabilities at
each age are constant over time, but decrease with age.
Let Ni,t be the number of agents of age i at time t. At each time t = 0, 1, 2...,
N0,t identical agents are born. Thus, the number of agents of age 1 born at
time t is N1,t+1 = p1N0,t and the number of agents of age 2 born at time t is
N2,t+2 = p1p2N0,t. Finally, we assume that the number of agents of age 0 grows
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at a constant growth rate, denoted n, with n > −1:
N0,t = (1 + n)N0,t−1. (1)
2.2 Annuity markets
Agents can invest in two types of ﬁnancial products: bonds and life annuities.
The yield on bonds is risk free: each unit of consumption invested at time t− 1
yields Rt units of consumption at time t. Concerning annuities, two types of
contracts are oﬀered by insurance companies. It is assumed that information
on the probability of survival is perfect and that markets for each contract are
competitive, which implies that the proposed contracts are fair. It is further
assumed that a company cannot cross-subsidize the types of contracts it oﬀers.
All these assumptions imply that the proﬁt of insurance companies is zero for
each contract. We will now explain in detail the characteristics of both annuity
contracts.
The ﬁrst annuity contract oﬀered to agents is that found in most articles of
the literature since the seminal article of Yaari (1965). This is an actuarially
fair contract that can be renegotiated each time. If the agent survives, he
recovers the capital plus interest and can consume or invest again. Because of
this feature, we refer to it as a ﬂexible annuity contract. Assuming zero proﬁt
as stated above, calculation of the annuity yield is well known; it results from
sharing, among the survivors of a cohort, the capital plus interest of deceased
agents. A unit of consumption invested at time t− 1 by an agent of age i, i =
{1, 2}, therefore yields Rt/pi+1 units of consumption at time t, upon survival.
We denote a0,t and a1,t+1 as the demands for ﬂexible annuities at ages 0 and 1
by an agent born at time t. At age 2, the demand for annuities must be zero
because the agent has reached, by assumption, the last period of life.
The second annuity contract proposed to agents has the following features:
the investment must be made at age 0, the capital cannot be recovered before
age 2 and the remuneration received is independent of age. Annuity is said to be
illiquid because, at age 1, the agent receives only the interest of his investment.
Equivalently, it can be said that the agent must invest at age 1 the same amount
that he invested at age 0. We denote bt as the demand for illiquid annuities by
an agent of age 0 at time t. To calculate the annuity yield, the condition of zero
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proﬁt for insurance companies is applied. The companies collect at time t − 1
the agent’s savings and invest them at the risk-free rate. At time t, the value of
this investment, which is equal to
(N0,t−1bt−1 +N1,t−1bt−2)Rt, (2)
is redistributed among the surviving agents. If we denote Rt/πt as the yield at
time t for each unit of consumption invested in t− 1 or t− 2, we conclude that
the amount distributed must be equal to
(N1,tbt−1 +N2,tbt−2)
Rt
πt
. (3)
Consequently, by equalizing (2) and (3), the inverse of the premium solves:
πt =
p1 (1 + n) bt−1 + p1p2bt−2
(1 + n) bt−1 + p1bt−2
. (4)
If the demands for illiquid annuities are positive, it is easy to show that πt ∈
[p2, p1]. We conclude that the interest paid at age 1 is higher than that of the
ﬂexible annuities, while the interest paid at age 2 is lower. Hence, the ﬂexible
contract is more proﬁtable the older the agent and illiquid annuities can be
interpreted as an intergenerational transfer from agents age 2 to agents age 1.
This explains why the yield Rt/πt is a decreasing function of the population
growth rate, n. Finally, we note that in the limit case p1 = p2, the yields of the
two annuity contracts are equal.
2.3 Life-cycle choices
Each agent chooses a portfolio and a savings strategy to achieve an optimal
consumption allocation between the diﬀerent ages. The intertemporal expected
utility of an agent of age 0 at time t reads as:
u (c0,t) + θp1u (c1,t+1) + θ
2p1p2u (c2,t+2) , (5)
where ci,t+i is the consumption at age i, and θ > 0 is a discount factor. The
instantaneous utility function u, is increasing and concave, u′ > 0 and u′′ <
0, and is such that limx→0 u′ (x) = +∞ and limx→+∞ u′ (x) = 0. Budget
constraints are as follows: at time t, the agent of age 0 receives a wage, denoted
wt, which he allocates between consumption and savings. It may consist of
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ﬂexible annuities, a0,t, and illiquid annuity, bt. The budget constraint at age 0
is:
c0,t = wt − a0,t − bt. (6)
We notice that investment in risk-free bonds is not modelled here because it is
never an optimal strategy. Furthermore, short selling constraints are imposed
on both investments, which together with positivity constraints on consumption
allow us to eliminate degenerate strategies.
a0,t ≥ 0, bt ≥ 0, c0,t ≥ 0, c1,t+1 ≥ 0, c2,t+2 ≥ 0. (7)
At time t+ 1, the agent receives the capital and interest of his ﬂexible annuity
investment and the interest of his illiquid annuity investment. These ﬁnancial
revenues are used by the agent to ﬁnance his consumption and savings in the
form of ﬂexible annuities, for which the demand is denoted a1,t+1. The budget
constraint at age 1 is:
c1,t+1 = a0,t
Rt+1
p1
+ bt
(
Rt+1
πt+1
− 1
)
− a1,t+1. (8)
At time t + 2, which corresponds to the last period of life of the agent, con-
sumption is equal to the capital and interest of his ﬂexible and illiquid annuity
investments. The bounded lifespan hypothesis implies that the capital invested
in illiquid life annuity is recovered at age 21. The budget constraint at age 2 is:
c2,t+2 = a1,t+1
Rt+2
p2
+ bt
Rt+2
πt+2
. (9)
The problem of the agent is to choose {c0,t, c1,t+1, c2,t+2, a0,t, bt, a1,t+1} that
maximizes (5) subject to (6), (7), (8) and (9). Let us denote:
Rt+1 :=
p1
πt+1
Rt+1 − p1
(
1− p2
πt+2
)
. (10)
Our ﬁrst result is the following.
Proposition 1. The optimal portfolio satisﬁes:{
bt > 0 and a0,t = 0 if Rt+1 > Rt+1
bt = 0 and a0,t > 0 if Rt+1 < Rt+1
(11)
1This condition is the counterpart of a transversality condition that should be introduced
in a more realistic model with a large number of periods of life where survival probabilities
converge to 0 when age tends to inﬁnity.
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A portfolio satisfying bt > 0 and a0,t > 0 can be optimal only if Rt+1 = Rt+1.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this ﬁrst version of the model, without background risks nor borrowing
constraints, illiquidity is not an issue speciﬁc to the agent. Portfolio choice is
therefore based on a comparison of the respective yields from ﬂexible annuities
and illiquid annuities. Relevant yields are expected yields, discounted at the
risk-free interest rate and calculated assuming no reinvestment of the interest
received at age 12.
Through πt+1 and πt+2 given in (4), we see that R¯t+1 is aﬀected by the
demands for annuities by past and future generations. In particular, Rt+1 in-
creases with bt−1 and decreases with bt+1. Because the illiquid annuity contract
acts as a transfer from the oldest to the youngest, the more it is demanded by
the previous generation, the more the comparative advantage increases, but the
more it is demanded by the next generation, the more the comparative advan-
tage decreases. We also note that the yields of the two contracts are equal in
the limit case p1 = p2.
With Proposition 1, we have seen that the portfolio is generically composed
of a single type of contract. The optimal consumption allocation of the agent
then depends on the chosen contract. If ﬂexible annuities are chosen at age
0, the result is typical of that found in the literature: consumption dynamics
are independent of survival probabilities and increase according to the ratio of
the interest factor over the discount factor (Yaari, 1965). Conversely, if illiquid
annuities are chosen, the optimal consumption dynamics can be characterized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Rt+1 > Rt+1. The optimal consumption alloca-
tion satisﬁes:
u′ (c0,t)
u′ (c1,t+1)
>
u′ (c1,t+1)
u′ (c2,t+2)
if Rt+1 ≥ Rt+2. (12)
Thus, if the utility function is homogenous, inequality (12) can be rewritten as:
2The condition Rt+1 ≥ R˜t+1 can indeed be rewritten as:
p1
Rt+1
(
Rt+1
p1
)
+
p1p2
Rt+1Rt+2
(
Rt+2
p2
)
≥ p1
Rt+1
(
Rt+1
πt+1
)
+
p1p2
Rt+1Rt+2
(
Rt+2
πt+2
)
.
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c1,t+1
c0,t
>
c2,t+2
c1,t+1
if Rt+1 ≥ Rt+2. (13)
Proof. See Appendix.
Provided that the interest rate is not increasing and that the utility function
has standard properties, the holding of a portfolio composed of illiquid annuities
implies that the consumption growth rate decreases with age. This is explained
by the fact that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between ages 0 and 1
is given by Rt+1, which is higher than Rt+1 (as shown in Proposition 1), turns
to be greater than the MRS between ages 1 and 2, which is given by Rt+2.
Between ages 1 and 2, all additional savings are indeed invested in ﬂexible an-
nuities. The lower yield of investment opportunities when the agent ages can
explain the decrease in the growth of consumption. Introducing illiquid annu-
ities in a life-cycle model allows better reproduction of the stylized facts of the
individual’s consumption during his life cycle (see, e.g., Gourinchas and Parker,
2002 and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2007) even though annuities are
fairly priced3. It should be noted, moreover, that the MRS between periods 0
and 1 is aﬀected by the survival probabilities even if the intertemporal utility
function is additively separable4. For a given and constant demand for annu-
ities, it can be shown that the relationship is positive if the interest rate is higher
than the population growth rate.
In this section, we have shown that there exists a set of interest rate values
for which illiquid annuities are purchased by agents. In the next section, we
analyze the choice of agents when prices are determined by the equilibrium
conditions in all markets.
3 General equilibrium analysis
3.1 Annuities and the eﬃciency of the equilibrium
The production side of the model is standard. There exists a unique good that is
produced by many ﬁrms acting on a perfectly competitive market. The produc-
3Alternatively, a concave consumption can be obtained if annuities are not available (Davis,
1981) or not fairly priced (Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 2008).
4Bommier (2006) obtained the same kind of result with ﬂexible annuities under the condi-
tion of non separability of the utility function.
7
tion function displays constant returns-to-scale and satisﬁes Inada conditions.
We assume that only agents of age 0 are working and denote by kt the capital
stock per worker at time t. Assuming that capital depreciation rate is 100% per
period, the optimality conditions of the ﬁrms can be written as:
wt = f (kt)− ktf ′ (kt) and Rt = f ′ (kt) . (14)
The equilibrium condition on the capital market is satisﬁed if the capital
stock at time t+ 1 is equal to the sum of the savings of agents born at times t
and t− 1. This condition can be written as:
kt+1 =
a0,t + bt
1 + n
+
p1 (a1,t + bt−1)
(1 + n)
2 . (15)
In what follows, we assume there exists a unique steady-state. Depending
on the model parameters values, the interest rate at steady-state may be higher
or lower than the population growth rate. It is well known5 that a converg-
ing trajectory to such steady states is eﬃcient in the ﬁrst case and ineﬃcient
otherwise.
Let a stared variable denote the steady-state equilibrium value of the consid-
ered variable. The following proposition, which is the counterpart at equilibrium
of Proposition 1, characterizes the portfolio choices of agents based on the eﬃ-
ciency of the steady state.
Proposition 3. At steady-state, the optimal portfolio satisﬁes:⎧⎨
⎩
b∗ > 0 and a∗0 = 0 if f
′ (k∗) > 1 + n,
b∗ = 0and a∗0 > 0 if f
′ (k∗) < 1 + n.
(16)
A portfolio satisfying b∗ > 0 and a∗0 > 0 can be optimal only if f
′ (k∗) = 1 + n.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that if the equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient, the
agents hold illiquid annuities in the steady state. It is only when the equi-
librium is ineﬃcient that they are not held. The proof is simple and is based
on the diﬀerence between the yields oﬀered by ﬂexible and illiquid annuities.
Using equations (4), (10) and (14), written in the steady state, we observe that
5Cass 1972, De La Croix and Michel 2002, page 83
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R
∗
can be written as a linear function of the marginal productivity of capital:
R
∗
=
1 + n+ p1
1 + n+ p2
f ′ (k∗)− (p1 − p2) (1 + n+ p2)
1 + n+ p2
(17)
The yield on illiquid annuities is greater than on ﬂexible life annuity if and only
if it is greater than 1+n, the population growth factor. The ﬁgure below shows
the spread in yields as a function of the steady state interest factor R∗.
Insert Figure 1.
The intuition behind the result stated in Proposition 3 is based on the fact
that illiquid annuity represents a transfer from one generation to the next gen-
eration. When the population growth rate is relatively low, which is the case
when the equilibrium is eﬃcient, this transfer is inexpensive and the investment
is proﬁtable. Conversely, when the growth rate is high, illiquid annuity invest-
ment is unproﬁtable. Finally, at the Golden Rule, ﬂexible and illiquid annuities
have exactly the same proﬁtability. Somehow, illiquid life annuity is the op-
posite of a Pay-As-You-Go pension system, which is a transfer to the previous
generation and a proﬁtable investment when the equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
3.2 Annuities and the welfare at steady-state
The next step concerns the welfare of an agent in the steady state. We have
seen that when the equilibrium is eﬃcient, illiquid annuity is preferred to ﬂexible
annuity. This has been established for an equilibrium interest rate associated
to the level of capital per worker at equilibrium. It does not, however, take into
account the fact that the capital per worker may be diﬀerent in an economy
where illiquid annuities are proposed and in an economy where they are not.
So to evaluate the eﬀect of the supply of illiquid annuity contracts on welfare,
we proceed as follows: we compare the welfare obtained in an economy where
the two types of contracts are oﬀered to welfare obtained in an economy where
only ﬂexible annuity is available. The result of this comparison is presented in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let f ′ (k∗) > 1 + n. The welfare at steady-state is larger if
illiquid annuity contracts are available.
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Proof. See Appendix.
In the proof of Proposition 4, we show that the introduction of illiquid annu-
ity contracts increases the capital per worker in the steady state. The intuition
for this result is the following: as it induces a shift to youth, illiquid annuity
stimulates savings. This increase is conducive to steady-state welfare when the
equilibrium is ineﬃcient, as the utility increases with capital in that case. The
proof of Proposition 4 is based on the assumption of the existence of a unique
steady state. In the case of multiple equilibria, the same comparison can be
made using the stability properties.
In the long run, agents beneﬁt from the existence of an illiquid annuity
market provided that the equilibrium is eﬃcient. However, the existence of
an illiquid annuity market in the steady state depends on the decisions made
by agents along the transitory path. This is demonstrated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. Illiquid annuity contracts are oﬀered in the steady state only
if all previous generations have purchased illiquid annuity.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that the Pareto optimality of illiquid annuity contracts
at steady-state is not a suﬃcient condition for the existence of such a market.
While the generation born in t chooses not to invest in illiquid annuity, we see,
by using equation (4), that the preceding generation beneﬁts at age 2 from a
yield equal to Rt+1/p2, equal to the one of ﬂexible annuity, and the generation
that follows should settle at age 1 for a yield equal to Rt+2/p1. As this yield
is equal to one of ﬂexible annuity, the generation born at t + 1 has no interest
in investing in illiquid annuity, after which the contract is never requested.
We conclude that if it exists, the illiquid annuity contract represents a Pareto
improvement for all generations.
Equivalently, we can notice that illiquid annuities will never be demanded if
the contract has not been proposed before the initial time of the economy t = 0,
that is to say, if agents born at t = −1 do not have illiquid annuities in their
portfolio at t = 0. If the contract does not initially exist, it will not appear
spontaneously in a market economy. This fact makes it necessary to intervene
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in order to possibly compensate for earlier generations to increase the welfare
of future generations. Although it is not suﬃcient, this result may also help
understanding the low participation in annuity markets (for a recent survey on
the annuity puzzle, see Benartzi et al. 2011).
In this section, we have presented the conditions for the existence of an illiq-
uid annuity market and demonstrated the Pareto improvement that it generates.
In the next section, we discuss the robustness of our results.
4 Robustness
The results presented above are not changed if we consider alternative assump-
tions about the agents’ preferences and the environment in which they make
their decisions. We consider, in particular, a non-borrowing constraint at age
1, possibly with a background risk that may aﬀect consumption at ages 1 and
2, an assumption of bequest motivated by joy-of-giving, and ﬁnally, a subjec-
tive evaluation of the survival probabilities. We show that in all these cases,
Proposition 1 is not, or barely, changed.
The ﬁrst extension we consider is a non-borrowing constraint at age 1. In our
framework, this implies that selling annuities short, or equivalently purshasing
life insurance contracts (Bernheim, 1991), is not allowed. We therefore add the
following inequality to the optimization problem described above:
a1,t+1 ≥ 0. (18)
The Proposition 1 is modiﬁed as follows.
Proposition 6. Let the agent maximizes (5) subject to (6), (7), (8), (9) and
(18). The optimal portfolio satisﬁes:⎧⎨
⎩
bt > 0 if Rt+1 > Rt+1,
bt = 0, a0,t > 0 and a1,t > 0 if Rt+1 < Rt+1.
(19)
A portfolio satisfying bt > 0 and a0,t > 0 can be optimal only if Rt+1 ≥ Rt+1.
In the case Rt+1 > Rt+1, a0,t > 0 can be optimal only if a1,t+1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
With proposition 6, we see that introducing a non-borrowing constraint at
age 1 barely modiﬁes the optimal portfolio. Constraint (18) is binding only if
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the demand for illiquid annuities is positive, as the consumption at age 2 would
be otherwise zero. Provided that constraint (18) is binding, the MRS between
ages 0 and 1 is still greater than Rt+1 while remaining lower than Rt+1, whereas
between ages 1 and 2 is greater than Rt+2. In a nutshell, it is the dynamics of
consumption that is modiﬁed by the non-borrowing constraint, not the optimal
portfolio.
Let us now introduce a background risk that may reduce consumptions at
ages 1 and 2. This risk can be interpreted as health shocks that require costly
treatments and against with it is not possible to be insured6. Together with
the constraint (18), this shock makes the annuity contract non ﬂexible (Direr,
2010). Consumptions at ages 1 and 2 are then written as random variables,
denoted c˜1,t+1 and c˜2,t+2, and the expected utility of the agent of age 0 at time
t reads as:
u (c0,t) + θp1Eu (c˜1,t+1) + θ
2p1p2Eu (c˜2,t+2) . (20)
The optimal behavior of the agent is given in the following.
Proposition 7. Let the agent maximizes (20) subject to (6), (7), (8), (9) and
(18). The optimal portfolio satisﬁes the same conditions as those described in
Proposition 6.
Proof. See Appendix.
As the portfolio choice depends on a comparison of yields, it is not aﬀected
by considering random utilities.
The second extension we consider is a bequest motive. The investment
in regular bonds can indeed be justiﬁed on the grounds of intergenerational
altruism and, as shown by Lockwood (2012), this may help explaining the low
demand for annuities. Following Yaari (1965), the bonds held in the portfolio
at the age of death are bequested, and the utility of the agent increases with
the amount that is bequested. As in Davidoﬀ et al. (2005), we suppose that
capitalized value of the bequest enter the expected utility, which reads as:
u (c0,t) + θp1u (c1,t+1) + θ
2p1p2u (c2,t+2) + (1− p1) v (Rt+1Rt+2h0,t)
+p1 (1− p2) v (Rt+2h1,t+1) + p1p2v (h2,t+2) , (21)
6Long-Term care can be though as an example of this even though insurance contracts are
oﬀered in some countries. See Brown and Finkelstein (2011).
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where hi,t+i is the demand for bonds made by an agent of age i, i = {0, 1, 2},
as of time t + i. Function v is increasing and concave and we assume that
limx→0 v′ (x) = +∞, which restrict our analysis to interior solutions. Bonds’
yield is the risk-free rate. Thus, the budget constraints (6), (8), (9) are replaced
by the following ones:
c0,t = wt − a0,t − bt − h0,t, (22)
c1,t+1 = a0,t
Rt+1
p1
+ bt
(
Rt+1
πt+1
− 1
)
+ h0,tRt+1 − a1,t+1 − h1,t+1, (23)
c2,t+2 = a1,t+1
Rt+2
p2
+ bt
Rt+2
πt+2
+ h1,t+1Rt+2 − h2,t+2. (24)
The optimal behavior of the agent is given in the following.
Proposition 8. Let the agent maximizes (21) subject to (7), (22), (23), and
(24). The optimal portfolio satisﬁes conditions (11). Moreover, the capitalized
bequests are such that:⎧⎨
⎩
Rt+1Rt+2h0,t = Rt+2h1,t+1 = h2,t+2 if bt = 0,
Rt+1Rt+2h0,t < Rt+2h1,t+1 = h2,t+2 if a0,t = 0.
(25)
Proof. See Appendix.
The introduction of a joy-of-giving altruistic motive modiﬁes the optimal
porfolio as regular bonds are demanded in order to be bequested. However, the
remaining of the optimal portfolio is composed of ﬂexible annuities for Rt+1 <
Rt+1 and of illiquid annuities for Rt+1 > Rt+1. With ﬂexible annuities, the
optimal tradeoﬀ between consumption and bequest is the same as in Davidoﬀ et
al. (2005). The capitalized value of the bequest is constant and the consumption
at age 2 equals the return of what was invested in annuities at age 1. With
illiquid annuities annuities, the capitalized value of the bequest increases with
age (for the same reasons as those detailed for consumption in Proposition 2)
but, at age 2, the agent still consumes the share of his portfolio invested in
annuities.
The third extension considers a subjective evaluation of the survival proba-
bilities. Many studies have indeed demonstrated the importance of probability
distortion in risky choices, and notably when the risk at stake concerns health
and longevity (Brewer et al., 2007). We consider an agent endowed with subjec-
tive survival probabilities, denoted pˆ1 and pˆ2, which are such that pˆ1 = p1 and
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pˆ2 = p2. His preferences are represented by the following subjective expected
utility7:
u (c0,t) + pˆ1θu (c1,t+1) + pˆ2θ
2u (c2,t+2) . (26)
The rest of the model is the same as in section 2.3, which implies that agent’s
beliefs diﬀer from the insurers’ survival probabilities estimation.To simplify,
we therefore do not take into account the possibility for insurers to use this
information and modify annuity’s yields. The optimal behavior of the agent is
given in the following.
Proposition 9. Let the agent maximizes (26) subject to (6), (7), (8), and (9).
The optimal portfolio satisﬁes conditions (11).
Proof. See Appendix.
Once again, our main results are robust. Introducing a subjective evaluation
of longevity risk does not modiﬁes the preference for illiquid annuity as long as
their objective yield is suﬃciently large.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that illiquid annuity is preferred to ﬂexible one pro-
vided that the equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient. Moreover, the availability
of illiquid annuity permits a welfare improvement in the long run. Neverthe-
less, they are oﬀered in the steady-state only if all generations have purchased
them in the past. Consequently, policy intervention can be justiﬁed even if the
equilibrium is eﬃcient.
This study can be extended in several directions. First a multi-period setting
can be analyzed in order to investigate the issue of the optimal timing of annuity
purchase (Brugiavini, 1993) and discuss the opportunity represented by deferred
annuities. Second, heterogeneous agents could be introduced in order to focus
on adverse selection (Bommier et al., 2011) and redistribution issues (Cremer et
al., 2010). Finally, aggregate risk on mortality (Schulze and Post, 2010) as well
as other aggregate risk could be introduced in order to discuss the risk sharing
properties (Gollier, 2008) of the illiquid annuities we considered.
7Although diﬀerent models of representation of preferences under uncertainty have been
proposed, in case of two states of nature, the main models reach to one, namely the subjective
model (Savage, 1954).
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We denote μt as the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated
with the non-negativity constraint: a0,t ≥ 0, and λt as the one associated with:
bt ≥ 0. The ﬁrst order conditions of the optimization problem can be written
as:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
u′ (c0,t)− θRt+1u′ (c1,t+1) = μt,
u′ (c0,t)− θp1
(
Rt+1
πt+1
− 1
)
u′ (c1,t+1)− θ2p1p2Rt+2πt+2 u′ (c2,t+2) = λt,
u′ (c1,t+1)− θRt+2u′ (c2,t+2) = 0,
(27)
while the complementary slackness conditions are:
μta0,t = 0 and λtbt = 0. (28)
By rearranging equations in system (27), we obtain:(
R˜t+1 −Rt+1
)
θu′ (c1,t+1) + λt − μt = 0, (29)
where Rt+1 is deﬁned in (10).
Let us ﬁrst notice that having both λt > 0 and μt > 0 is not possible as
we can see, using the complementary slackness conditions (28) and the budget
constraints (8) and (9), that this would imply:
c1,t+1 = −a1,t+1 and c2,t+2 = a1,t+1Rt+2
p2
, (30)
which contradicts the fact that optimal consumptions should be positive. As a
consequence, we use (29) to state that:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λt = 0, μt > 0 if Rt+1 −Rt+1 > 0,
λt > 0, μt = 0 if Rt+1 −Rt+1 < 0,
λt = μt = 0 if Rt+1 −Rt+1 = 0,
(31)
which, using the complementary slackness conditions (28), allow us to conclude
the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For Rt+1 > Rt+1, we have seen in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 that λt = 0 and μt > 0. Thus, the last two equations of system (27) can
be rewritten as follows:⎧⎨
⎩
−u′ (c0,t) + θRt+1u′ (c1,t+1) = 0,
−u′ (c1,t+1) + θRt+2u′ (c2,t+2) = 0.
(32)
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Thus, we have:
u′ (c0,t)
u′ (c1,t+1)
≥ u
′ (c1,t+1)
u′ (c2,t+2)
⇔ Rt+1 ≥ Rt+2, (33)
which, using that fact that Rt+1 > Rt+1, allow us to write (12). To obtain (13),
we us the fact that if u is homogenous of degree κ + 1, u′ is homogenous of
degree κ, which implies that (33) can be rewritten as follows:(
c1,t+1
c0,t
)κ
≥
(
c2,t+2
c1,t+1
)κ
⇔ Rt+1 ≥ Rt+2 .  (34)
Proof of Proposition 3. An intertemporal equilibrium is a collection:
{c0,t, c1,t, c2,t, bt, a0,t, a1,t, πt+1, Rt+1, wt+1, kt+1}t≥0 , (35)
which satisﬁes the budget constraints (6), (8) and (9), the optimality conditions
(14) and (27), the complementary slackness conditions (28), the zero-proﬁt con-
dition (4) and the equilibrium condition (15). At steady state, the equilibrium
is the solution of the following system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
c0 = f (k)− kf ′ (k)− a0 − b,
c1 = a0
f ′(k)
p1
+ b
(
f ′ (k) 1+n+p1p1(1+n+p2) − 1
)
− a1,
c2 = a1
f ′(k)
p2
+ bf ′ (k) 1+n+p1p1(1+n+p2) ,
k = a0+b1+n +
p1(a1+b)
(1+n)2
,
0 = [u′ (c0)− θf ′ (k)u′ (c1)] a0,
0 =
[
u′ (c0)− θp1
(
f ′ (k) 1+n+p1p1(1+n+p2) − 1
)
u′ (c1)− θ2p2f ′ (k) 1+n+p11+n+p2u′ (c2)
]
b,
0 = u′ (c1)− θf ′ (k)u′ (c2) ,
(36)
as well as (4) and (14).
From Proposition 1, we know that the possible portfolio at steady-state are:
(1) a∗0 > 0 and b
∗ > 0, (2) a∗0 = 0 and b
∗ > 0, (3) a∗0 > 0 and b
∗ > 0. Let us
consider those three cases successively.
For a∗0 > 0 and b
∗ > 0, the last three equations of (36) can be rewritten as:[
f ′ (k) + p1 − (f ′ (k) + p2) 1 + n+ p1
1 + n+ p2
]
u′ (c1) = 0, (37)
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which is satisﬁed for f ′ (k) = 1+n, i.e. when the capital is at the Golden Rule.
For a∗0 = 0 and b
∗ > 0, the last three equations of (36) can be rewritten as:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u′ (c0)− θf ′ (k)u′ (c1) ≥ 0,
u′ (c0)− θ
(
f ′ (k) 1+n+p11+n+p2 − p1 + p2
1+n+p1
1+n+p2
)
u′ (c1) = 0,
(38)
which are satisﬁed only if f ′ (k) ≥ 1+n. Using what has been shown just above,
we conclude that if f ′ (k) > 1 + n, one has a∗0 = 0.
Finally, for a∗0 > 0 and b
∗ = 0, the last three equations of (36) can be
rewritten as:[
f ′ (k)
(
1− 1 + n+ p1
1 + n+ p2
)
+ p1 − p2 1 + n+ p1
1 + n+ p2
]
u′ (c1) ≥ 0, (39)
which is satisﬁed only if f ′ (k) ≤ 1+n. As above, f ′ (k) < 1+n, implies b∗ = 0.

Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in two steps. In step 1, we show that
the capital stock is higher in an economy where ﬂexible and illiquid annuities
are proposed than in an economy where only ﬂexible annuities are proposed. In
step 2, we show that the utility increases with the capital stock.
Step 1. Let us consider ﬁrst an economy where ﬂexible and illiquid annuities
are proposed. If f ′ (k) > 1 + n, we can use the proof of Proposition 3 to state
that the steady-state solves:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
c0 = f (k)− kf ′ (k)− b,
c1 = b
(
f ′ (k) 1+n+p1p1(1+n+p2) − 1
)
− a1,
c2 = a1
f ′(k)
p2
+ bf ′ (k) 1+n+p1p1(1+n+p2) ,
k = b1+n +
p1(a1+b)
(1+n)2
,
0 = u′ (c0)− θ
(
[f ′ (k) + p2] 1+n+p11+n+p2 − p1
)
u′ (c1) ,
0 = u′ (c1)− θf ′ (k)u′ (c2) .
(40)
System (40) reduces to a system in (c0, k) that reads as:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−u′ (c0) + θ[f
′(k)(1+n+p1)−(p1−p2)(1+n)]
(1+n+p2)
u′ (c1) = 0,
−u′ (c1) + θf ′ (k)u′ (c2) = 0,
(41)
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where: ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
c1 =
[f(k)−kf ′(k)−c0]
p1
(
f ′(k)(1+n+p1)
1+n+p2
+ (1 + n)
)
− (1+n)2kp1 ,
c2 =
(1+n)2
p1p2
kf ′ (k)− [f(k)−kf
′(k)−c0]f ′(k)(1+n+p1)(1+n)
p1p2(1+n+p2)
.
(42)
Let us consider now an economy where only ﬂexible annuities are proposed. The
steady-state of such an economy solves:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
c0 = f (k)− kf ′ (k)− a0,
c1 = a0
f ′(k)
p1
− a1,
c2 = a1
f ′(k)
p2
,
k = a01+n +
p1a1
(1+n)2
,
0 = u′ (c0)− θf ′ (k)u′ (c1) ,
0 = u′ (c1)− θf ′ (k)u′ (c2) .
(43)
System (43) reduces to a system in (c0, k) that reads as:⎧⎨
⎩
−u′ (c0) + θf ′ (k)u′ (c1) = 0,
−u′ (c1) + θf ′ (k)u′ (c2) = 0,
(44)
where: ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
c1 = [f (k)− kf ′ (k)− c0] f
′(k)+(1+n)
p1
− (1+n)2kp1 ,
c2 = {(1 + n) k − [f (k)− kf ′ (k)− c0]} (1+n)f
′(k)
p1p2
.
(45)
The objective is thus to compare the steady-state capital that is the solution
of (41) with the one that is solution of (44). To do so, we set up, for z ∈
[1, (1 + n+ p1) / (1 + n+ p2)], a more general system that writes:⎧⎨
⎩
−u′ (f (k)− kf ′ (k)− x) + θ [f ′ (k) z − (1 + n) (z − 1)]u′ (c1) = 0,
−u′ (c1) + θf ′ (k)u′ (c2) = 0,
(46)
where ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x = f (k)− kf ′ (k)− c0,
c1 =
x[f ′(k)z+(1+n)]
p1
− (1+n)2kp1 ,
c2 = [(1 + n) k − xz] (1+n)f
′(k)
p1p2
.
(47)
We notice that for z = 1, system (46) reduces to system (44) while for z =
(1 + n+ p1) / (1 + n+ p2), system (46) reduces to system (41). To prove our
18
claim, we hence aim at showing that:
dk∗
dz
> 0, (48)
where k∗ is the capital stock that is the solution of (46). Let us rewrite the ﬁrst
equation in (46) as F (x, k; z) = 0 and the second as G (x, k; z) = 0. One has:
dk
dz
= −
F ′z − G
′
z
G′x
F ′x
F ′k − G
′
k
G′x
F ′x
. (49)
Consider ﬁrst the numerator of (49). Let σ (c) := −u′ (c) /cu′′ (c). Simple
computations give that the sign of F ′z −G′zF ′x/G′x is the same as the one of:
f ′ (k)− (1 + n)
f ′ (k) z − (1 + n) (z − 1)
×
{
1
σ (c1)
f ′ (k) z + (1 + n)
x [f ′ (k) z + (1 + n)]− (1 + n)2 k +
1
σ (c2)
z
(1 + n) k − xz
}
+
1
c0σ (c0)
1
σ (c1)
xf ′ (k)
x [f ′ (k) z + (1 + n)]− (1 + n)2 k
+
1
c0σ (c0)
1
σ (c2)
x
(1 + n) k − xz
+
1
σ (c1)
1
σ (c2)
x
(1 + n) k − xz
(1 + n)
x [f ′ (k) z + (1 + n)]− (1 + n)2 k , (50)
which is positive as we supposed that f ′ (k) > (1 + n). To determine the sign of
the denominator, we use the assumption of the existence of a unique equilibrium.
System (46) can be written as a single dimension problem: F (φ (k; z) , k; z) = 0
where φ (.) is the implicit function obtained using G (x, k; z) = 0. The deriva-
tive of F (φ (k; z) , k; z) with respect to k is given by F ′k − G′kF ′x/G′x. As
F (φ (0; z) , 0; z) > 0, we conclude that the derivative, computed at the equi-
librium k∗ is negative. Using (49), we ﬁnally conclude that dk/dz > 0.
Step 2. We now compute the derivative of the intertemporal utility function
with respect to capital, such as
u′ (c0)
dc0
dk
+ θp1u
′ (c1)
dc1
dk
+ θ2p1p2u
′ (c2)
dc2
dk
, (51)
In steady-state of an economy where both ﬂexible and illiquid annuities are
proposed, we use (41) and (42) to obtain that the sign of (51) is the same as
the one of:
[f ′ (k)− (1 + n)]
[
k (1 + n)− [f (k)− 2kf ′ (k)− c0]
(
1 + n+ p1
1 + n+ p2
)]
. (52)
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Using the fact that c2, whose expression is given in (42), is positive we conclude
that (52) is positive. Hence, an increase in capital increases the welfare of the
agent in the steady-state. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The objective is to prove that if there exists T such that
bT−1 = 0 then bT+i = 0 for all i = 0, 1, 2, ... To prove it, we consider the yield of
the investment in illiquid annuities made at time T . Replacing (4) and bT−1 = 0
in (10), we obtain:
RT+1 = RT+1 − p1
(
1− p2
p1
(1 + n) bT+1 + p1bT
(1 + n) bT+1 + p2bT
)
. (53)
For bT+1 > 0, we obtain that RT+1 > RT+1, which implies, using Proposition
1, that bT = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 1. We
denote (μt, λt, γt) as the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the non-
negativity constraints: a0,t ≥ 0, bt ≥ 0 and a1,t ≥ 0. The ﬁrst order conditions
of the optimization problem can be written as:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
u′ (c0,t)− θRt+1u′ (c1,t+1) = μt,
u′ (c0,t)− θp1
(
Rt+1
πt+1
− 1
)
u′ (c1,t+1)− θ2p1p2Rt+2πt+2 u′ (c2,t+2) = λt,
u′ (c1,t+1)− θRt+2u′ (c2,t+2) = γt+1,
(54)
while the complementary slackness conditions are:
μta0,t = 0, λtbt = 0 and γt+1a1,t+1 = 0. (55)
By rearranging equations in system (54), we obtain:
(
Rt+1 −Rt+1
)
θu′ (c1,t+1) + λt − μt − γt+1 p2
πt+2
= 0, (56)
where Rt+1 is deﬁned in (10).
Let us consider the various conﬁgurations that are possible. As in the proof
of Proposition 1, the case λt > 0 and μt > 0 is not optimal as it implies that
the sign of c1,t+1 is the opposite of the one of c2,t+2. Similarly, the case λt > 0
and γt+1 > 0 is neither optimal as it implies c2,t+2 = 0. We now use equation
(56) to establish that:
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- for Rt+1 > Rt+1, one has λt < μt + γt+1p2/πt+2, which necessarily implies:
λt = 0 and μt + γt+1p2/πt+2 > 0. Condition λtbt = 0 implies that bt ≥ 0.
However, bt = 0 is not possible as the positivity of c1,t+1 would thus imply
a0,t > 0 (and μt = 0) while the positivity of c2,t+2 would imply a1,t+1 > 0 (and
γt+1 = 0). Thus, bt > 0. Moreover, μt ≥ 0 and γt+1 ≥ 0, with at least one of
the two inequalities being strict.
- for Rt+1 = Rt+1, one has λt = μt + γt+1p2/πt+2, which necessarily implies:
λt = μt = γt+1 = 0.
- for Rt+1 > Rt+1, one has λt > μt + γt+1p2/πt+2, which necessarily implies:
λt > 0 and μt = γt+1 = 0. Due to (55) we conclude that bt = 0 while the
positivity of c1,t+1 implies a0,t > 0 and the positivity of c2,t+2 implies a1,t+1 > 0.

Proof of Proposition 7. Following the same derivations as those made in the
proof of Proposition 6, we obtain:
(
Rt+1 −Rt+1
)
θEu′ (c˜1,t+1) + λt − μt − γt+1 p2
πt+2
= 0, (57)
which is the counterpart of (56). The reasonning made after (56) also applies
here. 
Proof of Proposition 8. The ﬁrst order conditions of the agent’s problem are
given by (27), (28) and:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−u′ (c0,t) + θp1Rt+1u′ (c1,t+1) + (1− p1)Rt+1Rt+2v′ (Rt+1Rt+2h0,t) = 0,
−θu′ (c1,t+1) + θ2p2Rt+2u′ (c2,t+2) + (1− p2)Rt+2v′ (Rt+2h1,t+1) = 0,
−θ2u′ (c2,t+2) + v′ (h2,t+2) = 0.
(58)
As a consequence (29) and (31) still hold. Moreover, by replacing the ﬁrst and
the third equations of (27) in (58), we obtain:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
− μt(1−p1)Rt+1 − θu′ (c1,t+1) +Rt+2v′ (Rt+1Rt+2h0,t) = 0,
−θu′ (c1,t+1) +Rt+2v′ (Rt+2h1,t+1) = 0,
−θu′ (c1,t+1) +Rt+2v′ (h2,t+2) = 0.
(59)
This allow us to conclude that:⎧⎨
⎩
Rt+1Rt+2h0,t = Rt+2h1,t+1 = h2,t+2 if μt = 0,
Rt+1Rt+2h0,t < Rt+2h1,t+1 = h2,t+2 if μt > 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 9. As in the proof of Proposition 1, the ﬁrst order condi-
tions of the optimization problem can be written as:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
u′ (c0,t)− θRt+1 pˆ1p1u′ (c1,t+1) = μt,
u′ (c0,t)− θpˆ1
(
Rt+1
πt+1
− 1
)
u′ (c1,t+1)− θ2pˆ1pˆ2Rt+2πt+2 u′ (c2,t+2) = λt,
u′ (c1,t+1)− θRt+2 pˆ2p2u′ (c2,t+2) = 0,
(60)
while the complementary slackness conditions are given by (28). By rearranging
equations in system (60), we obtain:
(
R˜t+1 −Rt+1
)
θ
pˆ1
p1
u′ (c1,t+1) + λt − μt = 0, (61)
where Rt+1 is deﬁned in (10). The rest of the proof is similar to the one of
Proposition 1. 
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Figure 1. Spread in yields at steady state


f ′(k)
R∗
R¯∗
1 + n
26
